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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
  
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 In this labor dispute, the Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) found that Greensburg Coca-Cola Bottling Company, Inc. 
(Greensburg Coca-Cola or the Company) unlawfully bargained to 
impasse and locked-out its employees to pressure them into 
accepting its "final offer."  This included its proposal that the 
collective bargaining unit include only full-time employees 
defined as those working 40-hour weeks.  The ALJ held that such a 
negotiation technique constituted bad faith bargaining, and thus 
Greensburg Coca-Cola violated sections 8(a)(1), (3) and (5) of 
the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3) and 
(5) (the NLRA or Act).  A divided three-member panel of the 
National Labor Relations Board (the NLRB or Board) affirmed, with 
corrections, the ALJ's findings and conclusions. 
 The Company has filed a petition for us to review the 
Board's order pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) and the Board has 
filed an application for enforcement of its order pursuant to 29 
U.S.C. § 160(e).  We grant the Company's motion for review and 
deny the application for enforcement. 
 I. 
 Greensburg Coca-Cola is a corporation operating as a 
distribution facility in Greensburg, Pennsylvania.  Local Union 
No. 30 of the Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers 
(the Union) represents the eight to ten warehouse employees at 
Greensburg Coca-Cola.  Shortly after the Company purchased the 
  
distribution facility from its previous operator in April of 
1989, the parties began negotiating a new collective bargaining 
agreement and agreed to extend the previous contract during 
negotiations on an indefinite basis.  
 When the NLRB certified the Union to represent the 
Company's warehouse employees at the Greensburg facility in June 
of 1974, the Board described the bargaining unit in the 
recognition clause as "[a]ll plant employees . . . excluding all 
other employees."  However, the previous collective bargaining 
agreement, as well as every contract since the Union's 
certification, defined the bargaining unit as, "only full-time 
plant employees . . . excluding all other employees."  At the 
hearing before the ALJ, neither party was able to proffer a 
witness who could explain why there were differences in language 
between the Board certification and the parties' collective-
bargaining agreements, or testify with certainty whether regular 
part-time employees were ever used by the employer during the 
parties' collective bargaining relationship.   
 Past collective-bargaining agreements also provided 
that "all regular full-time employees" would join the Union upon 
the completion of their 60-day probationary period, and that 
employees covered by the agreements were not guaranteed 40 hours 
of work per week.  A dispute between the parties over the 
definition of "full-time" employees arose when the Union 
requested that two part-time employees who had been previously 
hired by the Company's predecessor in 1988 as night loaders be 
made members of the bargaining unit.  Although these men were 
  
employed on a regular basis, they often worked less than 40 hours 
per week.  These employees were not members of the Union, nor had 
they ever been asked or required to join.  The Union never filed 
a grievance or otherwise complained that these men had not joined 
the Union or that the substantive terms of the collective-
bargaining agreement were not being applied to them.1   
 Immediately after the Company purchased the facility in 
June 1989, the parties began their first bargaining session.  The 
Company submitted numerous proposals to the Union.  One of the 
proposals suggested clarifying existing contract language in the 
recognition clause of the contract by specifically excluding "all 
part-time employees" from the bargaining unit.  The Union 
rejected the proposal, taking the position that it had 
traditionally represented all employees who performed bargaining 
unit work, regardless of the number of hours per week that they 
worked.  The Union stated that it did not want to waive its right 
to represent employees who regularly worked less than 40 hours 
per week and that it had in the past represented all regularly 
employed persons, regardless of the number of hours worked. 
 At the second negotiating meeting, the Company withdrew 
its proposal to specifically exclude regular part-time employees 
from the bargaining unit.  Instead, it proposed to maintain the 
language of the recognition clause as it had existed in the 
previous agreements, but took the interpretive position that the 
                     
 
   1Greensburg Coca-Cola subsequently agreed to include the two 
employees in the bargaining unit upon verifying that they had 
been working full-time hours. 
  
term "full-time plant employees" as used in the agreements meant 
employees working 40 hours per week.  The Union replied that the 
Company's withdrawal of its proposed language regarding part-time 
employees was merely a change in form rather than in substance, 
and refused to agree to the suggested definition.  The Union 
expressed its concern that if part-time employees were excluded 
from the bargaining unit, the Company could replace full-time 
positions with part-time employees at will, thereby reducing the 
size of the unit or eroding it altogether.   
 At the third meeting, the parties reiterated their 
positions, and the Union suggested that part-time employees were 
those who did not work on a regular basis, such as summer 
employees or employees who had not completed the probationary 
period.  The parties again reiterated their positions at two of 
the four subsequent bargaining sessions.  At the next meeting 
held on July 24, 1990, the Union proposed that employees who 
regularly worked less than 40 hours per week be included in the 
bargaining unit, but that the Company have the right to hire 
casual part-time employees on an occasional basis such as summer 
vacations.  The Company rejected the Union's counter-proposal.   
 The Union then asked Greensburg Coca-Cola for language 
regarding its intended utilization of part-time employees, and 
the Company presented the Union with what it termed its "final 
offer."  This final offer contained the recognition clause as 
originally stated in the previous bargaining agreements and 
proposed that the Company would not utilize part-time employees 
if full-time employees were on layoff status.  This proposal 
  
provided that part-time employees would be considered 
probationary, that they could be terminated at any time without 
contractual recourse, and that they would not be entitled to 
fringe benefits or the contractual wage rate, but would be paid 
as determined by the Company.  When the Union rejected the 
proposal, the Company served the Union with notice of its intent 
to terminate the extension agreement effective July 27, 1990. 
 The Union, however, objected to terminating the 
negotiations and the parties held two more bargaining meetings, 
but failed to make any progress.  On September 19, 1990, 
Greensburg Coca-Cola locked out all of the employees in the 
warehouse bargaining unit in an effort to apply economic pressure 
on them to accept its final offer.  The Company hired temporary 
replacements to take the place of locked out employees.  After 
the lockout began, the parties held two more bargaining meetings 
where the parties discussed many issues and reiterated their 
positions regarding part-time employees, but again no progress 
was made.  The ALJ credited Union testimony that the Company made 
it clear that the lockout would end only when the Union ratified 
the final offer.  
 After the Union filed the charges at issue here, the 
parties met once again.  The ALJ credited the Union's testimony 
that at that meeting the Company altered its final offer with 
respect to the recognition clause, proposing for the first time 
that regular part-time employees be included in the bargaining 
unit.  The parties then resolved this issue, although the lockout 
continued because the Union did not accept the Company's final 
  
offer as a whole which included a number of other proposals that 
had also been the subject of negotiations. 
 The ALJ noted that throughout every negotiating meeting 
the parties discussed various proposals and counter-proposals 
pertaining to other mandatory subjects of collective bargaining.  
The ALJ held that although the parties discussed the recognition 
clause and its interpretation, they also discussed wages, health 
and welfare benefits, pensions, holidays, vacations, grievance 
and arbitration procedures, management rights, and employee work 
rules.  Greensburg Coca-Cola alleges that the parties disagreed 
on 32 subjects.  Although not discussed by the ALJ, we presume 
that the parties could not agree on one or more of these other 
issues, thereby forcing the lockout to continue. 
 II. 
 The Board's application of the law to particular facts 
and its factual findings are conclusive if supported by 
substantial evidence on the record as considered as a whole, 
including any evidence detracting from the Board's view.  NLRB v. 
Pizza Crust Co., 862 F.2d 49, 51 (3d Cir. 1988); 29 U.S.C. § 
160(e).  Therefore, this court "may [not] displace the Board's 
choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though the 
court would justifiably have made a different choice had the 
matter been before it de novo."  Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 
340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).  
 Our review of questions of law is plenary.  Tubari, 
Ltd. v. NLRB, 959 F.2d 451, 453 (3d Cir. 1992).  However, we give 
some, but not unlimited, deference to the NLRB's construction of 
  
a statute.  See NLRB v. International Assoc. of Bridge, etc., 434 
U.S. 335, 350 (1978).  Thus, "[w]e will enforce a Board order 
that rests on a construction of the NLRA that is not 'an 
unreasonable or unprincipled construction of the statute.'"  NLRB 
v. Joy Technologies, Inc., 990 F.2d 104, 108 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(citations omitted). 
 III. 
 The issue before us is whether Greensburg Coca-Cola 
insisted on a non-mandatory subject of bargaining as a condition 
to a labor agreement.  Sections 8(a)(5), 8(b)(3) and 8(d) of the 
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (b), and (d), require an employer 
to bargain "in good faith" with the statutory representative of 
its employees with respect to "wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment."  Neither party is legally obligated to 
yield to the other on these mandatory subjects of bargaining.  As 
to non-mandatory matters, however, each party is free to bargain 
or not to bargain.  NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 
356 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1958).  Thus, a party violates section 
8(a)(5) of the Act by insisting, even in good faith, on a non-
mandatory subject as a precondition to reaching agreement on 
mandatory subjects.  Id.; NLRB v. Pennsylvania Telephone Guild, 
799 F.2d 84, 87 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 The recognition clause in a collective bargaining 
agreement is not a mandatory subject of bargaining.  See Borg-
Warner, 356 U.S. at 350.  Neither is the scope of a bargaining 
unit.  See NLRB v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 
532 F.2d 902, 907 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1072 
  
(1977).  Therefore, although the parties are free to negotiate 
about the scope of the bargaining unit, the employer may not make 
this a prerequisite to an agreement on mandatory items.  Id; see 
also Hill-Rom Co. v. NLRB, 957 F.2d 454, 457 (7th Cir. 1992) ("if 
an employer could vary unit descriptions at will, it would have 
the power to sever the link between a recognizable group of 
employees and its union as the collective bargaining 
representative"). 
 Throughout all of the negotiations, Greensburg Coca-
Cola insisted that part-time employees were historically excluded 
from the bargaining union.  To support its position, the Company 
emphasizes that the plain language of the previous contract's 
recognition clause states that the bargaining unit is to include 
"only full-time plant employees."  Greensburg Coca-Cola 
additionally notes that the two part-time night loaders had 
worked for over a year without being included in the Union.  The 
Company argues that it is incredible that two employees would 
forgo their right to union wages and benefits for over one year 
if they were in fact entitled to join the Union.  The Company 
further contends that if the Union so firmly believed that the 
two men belonged in the bargaining unit based on the completion 
of their probationary periods, the Union would have insisted that 
they be admitted immediately. 
 The ALJ acknowledged that the Company's argument had 
surface appeal, but rejected it upon considering the previous 
collective bargaining agreements as a whole and noting 
specifically that employees were not guaranteed a full 40 hours 
  
of work per week.  The ALJ credited Union testimony that the 
omission of the two night loaders was an oversight and that upon 
the Union's recognition of the oversight, it immediately raised 
the matter, but that the Company requested the Union to postpone 
discussing the issue until the upcoming contract negotiations.  
The ALJ found that the oversight was understandable, given the 
high attrition rate among night loaders. 
 The ALJ further found the testimony of the Union 
steward to be credible.  The Union steward, who was on the 
Union's negotiating committee in 1974, testified that he 
understood the term "full-time employee" to mean all employees 
working on a regular basis who had completed their probationary 
period, regardless of the number of hours worked per week.  He 
testified in essence that employees were historically considered 
"part-time" until they completed their probationary period, at 
which time they joined the Union pursuant to the security clause 
and were thereafter considered "full-time."  The Union steward 
testified that he was not aware of any employee working less than 
40 hours per week on a regular basis who had been excluded from 
the bargaining unit, with the sole exception of students hired as 
summer help.  These students were not considered part of the 
bargaining unit, were not required to join the Union pursuant to 
the security clause, and were not accorded contract benefits even 
if they worked more than 60 days.   
 The Board adopted the ALJ's finding that the Union had 
historically represented all regular company employees who had 
completed their probationary period, irrespective of whether they 
  
worked 40 hours or less.  The Board further reasoned that giving 
the term "full-time" the literal interpretation urged by the 
Company would allow it to reduce the size of the unit at will 
because the contract did not guarantee employees a 40-hour work 
week and it gave the Company the right to unilaterally curtail 
work hours.  
 Greensburg Coca-Cola argues that the Board's and the 
ALJ's finding that it was attempting to change the scope of the 
bargaining unit is inconsistent with the evidence that after it 
withdrew its first proposal, it maintained the language of the 
previous recognition clause.  The Company suggests that the 
recognition clause issue was of little importance to the parties.  
As support, it points out that the parties did not discuss the 
interpretation issue of part-time employees in the two meetings 
after the submission of its final offer, and did not raise it 
again until the first meeting after the lockout.  The Company 
further notes that the first two unfair labor practice charges 
filed by the Union failed to mention the part-time issue.  
Finally, Greensburg Coca-Cola suggests that because the parties 
were apart on so many other issues and because the Union failed 
to respond to the final proposal, the Company believed that it 
had met the Union's concerns with respect to part-time employees. 
 We find the Company's assertions to be persuasive and 
supported by the record.  The Board's finding that Greensburg 
Coca-Cola bargained to impasse on the exclusion from the unit of 
part-time employees as a condition to reaching agreement is not 
supported by the record.  To the contrary, the record shows that 
  
it was only in the Company's first contract proposal that it 
expressly sought to exclude part-time employees from the unit.  
After withdrawing this proposal, the Company did not attempt to 
alter the bargaining unit but rather merely advanced its 
interpretation of the contractual language.  The party's 
disagreement as to the interpretation of the term "full-time 
plant employee" is not the equivalent of insisting on a change in 
the recognition clause of the contract.  Moreover, as noted by 
the Board's dissenting opinion, had any question arisen after the 
execution of the collective bargaining agreement over the 
interpretation of the scope of the recognition clause, the matter 
readily could have been resolved by arbitration under the 
grievance machinery in the agreement.  Thus, the Board erred in 
holding that the Company sought, through bargaining demands, in 
violation of sections 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act, to narrow 
the scope of those employees historically represented by the 
Union. 
 IV. 
 Greensburg Coca-Cola additionally challenges the 
Board's holding that it unlawfully locked out unit employees in 
violation of sections 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act.  The 
Board adopted the ALJ's conclusion that the Company unlawfully 
locked out unit employees in support of its proposal to exclude 
part-time employees from the bargaining unit.  The Company 
asserts that the Board erred by failing to analyze whether there 
was a nexus between the alleged unfair labor practice and the 
lockout. 
  
 An employer may lock out employees for the purpose of 
applying economic pressure on a union in support of a legitimate 
bargaining position.  American Ship Building Co. v. N.L.R.B., 380 
U.S. 300, 310 (1965); Local 825, International Union of Operating 
Engineers v. NLRB, 829 F.2d 458, 460-61 (3d Cir. 1987).  An 
employer, however, violates the NLRA by locking out employees to 
compel acceptance of an unfair labor practice, such as insisting 
on a non-mandatory subject as a precondition to reaching 
agreement on mandatory subjects.  See American Ship Building Co., 
380 U.S. at 308-09; Teamsters Local Union No. 639 v. NLRB, 924 
F.2d 1078, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 On September 19, 1990, Greensburg Coca Cola locked out 
employees and hired temporary replacements, informing the Union 
that it would end the lockout only if Union members ratified its 
final offer.  Two months later, the Company altered its final 
offer, proposing to adopt a recognition clause that expressly 
included part-time employees in the unit.  Importantly, the 
Company continued the lockout after it modified its proposal to 
include part-time employees in the recognition clause.  This fact 
clearly demonstrates that the issue of part-time employees was 
not central to the lockout.   
 The record shows that the lockout did not have an 
effect on the continued bargaining of the parties as to the issue 
of part-time employees.  Because the parties had reached a 
general impasse in bargaining on other issues, the Company's 
interpretive position regarding the recognition clause was not 
the cause of the impasse or the lockout.  See Latrobe Steel Co. 
  
v. NLRB, 630 F.2d 171, 181 (3d Cir. 1980) (for a strike to be 
deemed an unfair labor practice strike, it must, at least in 
part, be caused by an unfair labor practice; the mere fact that 
an unfair labor practice is committed prior to a strike does not 
necessarily render that strike an unfair labor practice strike), 
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 821 (1981).  Thus, the Company lawfully 
locked out unit employees for the purpose of applying economic 
pressure on the Union in support of a legitimate bargaining 
position.  Accordingly, the Board erred in holding that the lock 
out violated sections 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act.  
 V. 
 Accordingly, Greensburg Coco-Cola's petition for review 
will be allowed and the NLRB's motion for enforcement of its 
order will be denied.  Each side to bear its own costs. 
NLRB v. Greensburg Coca Cola Bottling Co., Nos. 93-3564/3604 
 
 
MANSMANN, J., dissenting. 
 
 
 I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion 
because I believe that Greensburg Coca-Cola's insistence on its 
definition of "full-time" employee constituted an unfair labor 
practice.   
 I do not disagree with the majority opinion's 
presentation of the law regarding unfair labor practice.   I 
would emphasize, however, that in NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-
Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958), the Supreme Court held 
that for a party to insist on a non-mandatory subject of 
bargaining is, "in substance," a refusal to bargain about 
mandatory subjects of bargaining.  Obviously that does not mean 
that negotiations are only to include mandatory subjects of 
bargaining, but that a party may not lawfully insist upon a non-
mandatory subject as a condition to any agreement.  Id.  The 
Court further held that the recognition clause in a collective 
bargaining agreement is not a mandatory subject of bargaining.  
Therefore, the scope of the bargaining unit is not a subject upon 
which either party may insist as a condition to the labor 
contract.  This conclusion is a cornerstone to successful 
collective bargaining, for parties cannot meaningfully bargain 
about the wages, hours, or conditions of employment unless they 
  
have agreed to the bargaining unit.  Douds v. Internal 
Longshoremen's Ass'n, 241 F.2d 278, 282 (2d Cir. 1957).  See also 
Boise Cascade Corp. v. NLRB, 860 F.2d 471, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1988); 
Newspaper Printing Corp. v. NLRB, 625 F.2d 956, 963 (10th Cir. 
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 911 (1981); Hess Oil & Chem. Corp. 
v. NLRB, 415 F.2d 440, 445 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 
U.S. 916 (1970). 
 Here, throughout all of the negotiations, Greensburg 
Coca-Cola insisted on its interpretation of the previous 
contract's recognition clause.  Greensburg Coca-Cola argued that 
its belief that part-time employees were historically excluded 
from the bargaining unit was due to the plain language of the 
recognition clause, which stated that the bargaining unit was to 
include "only full-time plant employees."  The Board found, 
however:  "As the newly arrived successor, the Respondent 
admittedly had no idea what past meaning had attached to the term 
`full-time employees.'"   
 In support of its position, Greensburg Coca-Cola 
pointed out that the two part-time night loaders had worked for 
over a year without being included in the union.  The Board held, 
however, that night loaders typically had a high attrition rate 
and that the reason the two employees were not included in the 
union at the conclusion of their probationary period was merely 
an oversight.  The Board further found that, upon the union's 
recognition of the oversight, it immediately raised the matter; 
  
at the company's request, the parties postponed discussing the 
issue until the upcoming contract negotiations.  Finally, the 
Board credited the union business agent's testimony that the two 
night loaders did not want to pay back dues or start trouble with 
the company. 
     Although the company's arguments raise legitimate 
questions for the union,2 they do not negate Greensburg Coca-
Cola's unlawful insistence on a non-mandatory subject of 
bargaining.  Borg-Warner instructs us that at the moment 
Greensburg Coca-Cola submitted its "final offer" to the union 
containing its interpretation of the term "full-time," as the 
Board found, Greensburg Coca-Cola committed an unfair labor 
practice.  It is of no accord that Greensburg Coca-Cola 
subsequently agreed to include part-time employees in the 
bargaining unit nor that the parties were apart on other matters.  
The unlawful conduct need not be the sole cause for the failure 
to reach an agreement.  Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding 
Workers v. NLRB, 320 F.2d 615, 618 (3d Cir. 1963) ("If the 
proposal is not a mandatory bargaining subject, insistence upon 
it was a per se violation of the duty to bargain."), cert. 
                     
    
2
 Greensburg Coca-Cola countered that it was incredible 
that two employees would forgo their right to union wages and 
benefits for over one year if they were in fact entitled to join 
the union.  If the union so firmly believed that the two men 
belonged in the bargaining unit based on the fact that they had 
completed their probationary periods, the company argued, the 
union would have insisted that they be admitted immediately. 
  
denied, 375 U.S. 984 (1964).  See also Latrobe Steel Co. v. NLRB, 
630 F.2d 171, 179 (3d Cir. 1980) ("What Borg-Warner prohibits is 
insistence upon a non-mandatory subject as a condition precedent 
to entering an agreement."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 821 (1981).   
 I take issue with the majority's crediting of 
Greensburg Coca-Cola's argument that the Board's and the ALJ's 
finding that it was attempting to change the scope of the 
bargaining unit is inconsistent with the evidence that after it 
withdrew its first proposal, Greensburg Coca-Cola maintained the 
language of the previous recognition clause.  Although this is 
true, there is substantial evidence in the record regarding the 
negotiations to support the Board's finding that Greensburg Coca-
Cola had consistently attempted to exclude part-time employees 
from the bargaining unit.3  
 I find it noteworthy that the parties' disagreement was 
not merely on the interpretation of the term "full-time" as 
Greensburg Coca-Cola suggests.  Greensburg Coca-Cola submitted 
its "final offer" containing the recognition clause language from 
previous collective bargaining agreements, as well as a proposal 
offering that the company would not utilize part-time employees 
if full-time employees were on layoff status.  The ALJ did not 
credit Greensburg Coca-Cola's self-serving testimony that it 
                     
    
3
 Furthermore, Greensburg Coca-Cola's argument that an 
impasse had not yet occurred conflicts squarely with our own 
analysis of that same argument in Latrobe Steel, 630 F.2d at 179 
(holding that impasse is not the test under Borg-Warner). 
  
believed it met the union's concern with respect to part-time 
employees with this offer.  Further, the Board found that 
Greensburg Coca-Cola, by this proposal, intended to exclude part-
time employees from contract coverage, and that it consistently 
attempted to insert its interpretation of "full-time employees" 
into the contract language.   
 There is substantial evidence in the record to support 
this finding.  I note the testimony that, although Greensburg 
Coca-Cola maintained the original contract language describing 
the unit scope as "full-time" employees, it conveyed quite 
clearly that it interpreted "full-time" to mean employees working 
40 hours per week, which is contrary to the previous course of 
dealing.  The Board's position is also supported by Greensburg 
Coca-Cola's original rejection of the union's proposal to include 
part-time employees in the unit scope. 
 There is certainly substantial evidence in the record, 
even considering the arguments of Greensburg Coca-Cola, that 
Greensburg Coca-Cola unlawfully insisted on changing the scope of 
the bargaining unit.  I am particularly impressed by the union 
steward's explanation of the previous understanding of the term 
"full-time."  The previous course of dealing is significant from 
a factual standpoint; as a matter of law Greensburg Coca-Cola 
violated §§ 8(a)(1), (3) and (5) at the moment it insisted on its 
  
interpretation of the scope of the bargaining unit, which is a 
non-mandatory subject of bargaining.4  
 I dissent, too, from the majority's crediting of 
Greensburg Coca-Cola's argument that the Board failed properly to 
analyze whether there was a nexus between the unfair labor 
practice and the lockout.  The Board adopted the ALJ's conclusion 
that Greensburg Coca-Cola unlawfully locked out unit employees in 
support of its proposal altering the unit's scope.  As a matter 
of law, I agree.  A lockout that is used to support an unlawful 
bargaining position is itself unlawful and violates the NLRA, 
specifically §§ 8(a)(1), (3), and (5).  Therefore, since I am of 
the opinion that Greensburg Coca-Cola maintained an unlawful 
bargaining position with regard to unit scope, it is a short step 
for me to conclude that its lockout in support of that position 
was unlawful. 
 For the foregoing reasons I would have granted the 
NLRB's motion for enforcement of its order and denied Greensburg 
Coca-Cola's petition for review. 
                     
    
4
 In light of my conclusion that Greensburg Coca-Cola 
unlawfully insisted on a non-mandatory subject of bargaining, I 
find unavailing the majority's crediting of Greensburg Coca-
Cola's suggestions that the recognition clause issue was of 
little importance to the parties and that because the parties 
were apart on so many other issues and the union failed to 
respond to the final proposal, Greensburg Coca-Cola believed that 
it had met the union's concerns with respect to part-time 
employees.   
